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TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN A
NEW SOUTH AFRICA
ZIYAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH
AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. Washington, D.C.: Howard Univer-
sity Press, 1994. vii + 276 pp.
Reviewed by Adrien Katherine Wing*
Almost all fifty-two African countries have been undergoing dramat-
ic political changes in the past few years.1 Reforms have occurred at
such a rapid rate that the period has been called the second indepen-
dence of the continent.2 After a post-colonial period typified by authori-
tarianism, 3 military coups, one party states, ethnic rivalries, and dictator-
ships, the populace in many countries is clamoring for multiparty de-
mocracy,4 free market capitalism, and constitutionalism.5
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. J.D., Stanford Law School
(1982); M.A., University of California at Los Angeles (1979); A.B., Princeton University
(1978).
1. Adrien K. Wing, Communitarianism vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia
and South Africa, 11 WIs. INT'L L.J. 295, 305 (1993).
2. Colin Legum, The Coming of Africa's Second Independence, 13 WASH. Q. 129 (1990).
3. Samuel Decalo, The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa,
91 AFR. AFF. 7, 13 (1991). See generally 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Larry
Diamond et al. eds., 1988).
The exceptions to authoritarianism are Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and
Namibia, which have been democratic since their independence. See Larry Diamond, Intro-
duction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1
(Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1988); John D. Holm, Botswana: A Paternalistic Democracy, in 2
DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 179; Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe: In
Search of Stable Democracy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 217;
John Hatchard & Peter Slinn, Towards an African Zimbabwean Constitution?, in 1988 THIRD
WORLD LEGAL STUD. 119 (1988); Edison Zvobgo, The Zimbabwe Constitution After Four
Years of Independence, PUB. L. 447 (1984); Wing, supra note 1, at 329. There are semi-
democratic cases as well. See Christian Coulon Senegal: The Development of Fragility and
Semidemocracy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 141.
4. See generally 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 3. Five concepts
characterize western style democracy: popular participation, social equality, concern for the
public welfare, united government, and a tradition of democratic behavior. Popular participa-
tion includes regular elections for governmental representatives and the ability to express
opinions publicly. Social equality presumes that all members of a society have the ability to
participate without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, religion, political
opinion, or property ownership. Concern for the public welfare means that the government
must hold "serving the people" as its primary objective. Seymour Martin Lipset notes the
preconditions that made western democracy possible: an open class system, a capitalist
economy, literacy, and a high degree of participation in voluntary organizations. Seymour M.
Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legiti-
macy, in EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY 151 (Charles F. Chuddle & Deane E. Heubauer
eds., 1969).
5. Wing, supra note 1, at 305. For an optimistic study regarding the existence of some
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Democracy is based in part on constitutionalism, the creation of a
culture in which the governing document is followed as a charter for the
exercise and limit of official power.6 Constitutional structures must be
established so that individual rights are guaranteed, but within a context
that gives the government the ability to implement fundamental reforms
and social reconstruction.7
Africa has been "a living laboratory for observing the interrelation
between American, European and African ideas of constitutionalism." 8
Unfortunately, this process has not necessarily resulted in documents
that are consistent with the various legal and cultural traditions of the
continent.
Constitution drafting sometimes seemed like participation in an
elaborate buffet, with elegant constitutional provisions from other
existing constitutions spread across the glittering sideboard, from
which the constitution maker filled her plate to her taste....
Sentences, paragraphs, whole sections and chapters float from one
constitution to the next.9
Many of these piecemeal constitutions have been symbolic at best,
totally irrelevant at worst.'0
Very few attempts to maintain democratic constitutions have pre-
vailed over the three decades of independence." The men and political
factions whose forceful leadership served so well in the independence
struggles often turned into petty despots.
democracies in Africa, see JOHN WISEMAN, DEMOCRACY IN BLACK AFRICA: SURVIVAL AND
REVIVAL (1990).
6. Crawford Young, The Debate on Democratization in Africa, in KENNETH W. THOMP-
SON, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA 121, 127 (1990).
7. Ralf Dahrendorf, Europe's Vale of Tears, MARXISM TODAY (1990), cited in Patrick
Fitzgerald, Democracy and Civil Society in South Africa: A Response to Daryl Glaser, 49
REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 94, 109 (1990).
8. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at vii.
9. Robert B. Seidman, Perspectives on Constitution-Making: Independence Constitutions
for Namibia and South Africa, 3 LESOTHO L.J. 45, 56 (1987).
10. According to Green, these constitutions
do not in any meaningful sense represent the goals or operating principles of any
significant interest groups/sub-classes, are not seen as relevant to constitutional
orders and exist because it is believed that, like national anthems, coats of arms
and flags, constitutions and 'development plans' are something that states have to
have for ceremonial and formal symbolic purposes.
Reginald H. Green, Participatory Pluralism and Pervasive Poverty: Some Reflections, THIRD
WORLD LEGAL STUD. 21, 47 (1989).
11. See Harvey Glickman, Frontiers of Liberal and Non-Liberal Democracy in Africa, 23
J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 234 (1988).
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[T]he elimination of [colonialism] does not guarantee freedom even
for the formerly oppressed. History unfortunately records many
examples of freedom fighters of one generation who become op-
pressors of the next. Sometimes the very qualities of determination
and sense of being involved in a historic endeavour which give
freedom fighters the courage to raise the banner of liberty in the
face of barbarous repression, transmute themselves into sources of
authoritarianism and historic forced marches later on. On the other
occasions, the habits of clandestinity and mistrust, of tight disci-
pline and centralized control, without which the freedom fighting
nucleus would have been wiped out, continue with dire results into
the new society. 2
Kenyan professor Ali Mazrui describes the African state as "excessively
authoritarian to disguise the fact that it is inadequately authoritative."' 3
Such states have failed to obtain legitimacy from their citizens, i.e., the
people fail to accept authority without coercion because they do not
believe that the ruling authority or processes are valid.' 4 Thus, "the
future of democracy in Africa is at best uncertain, fragile, and contradic-
tory.""5 Serious doubts thus exist about the sincerity or ability of African
countries to establish and sustain constitutional democracy, especially in
poor multi-ethnic societies.'
6
Professor Ziyad Motala, 7 a South African scholar on the faculty at
Howard Law School, has written a well timed book concerning the
democratic constitutional possibilities for the one African country with
12. ALBIE SACHS, THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS
(1990), cited in Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 108-09.
13. Ali Mazrui, Political Engineering in Africa, 25 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 279, 293 (1983).
14. See generally Seymour M. Lipset, Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy, in
LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 88 (William Connolly ed., 1984); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 15 (1990); 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968). The term legitimacy is used here in the sociologi-
cal sense. It is not the philosopher's concept of moral legitimacy. For a discussion of moral
legitimacy, see e.g., David Hume, On the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL &
LITERARY 465 (Eugene Miller ed., 1985); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV.
283 (1989).
15. Robert Fatton, Democracy and Civil Society in Africa, 2 MEDIT. Q. 83, 95 (1991).
Some commentators doubt the sincerity or ability of African states to sustain democracy,
given the lack of democratic traditions in multi-ethnic societies - especially under conditions
of extreme poverty. See Richard Sandbrook, Taming the African Leviathan, 7 WORLD POL'Y
J. 673, 679-85 (1990).
16. Sandbrook, supra note 15; see also Harvey Glickman, Frontiers of Liberal and Non-
Liberal Democracy in Tropical Africa, 23 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 234 (1988).
17. Professor Motala was born and educated in South Africa. He received his B.A. and
L.L.B. from the University of Natal at Durban. He earned his L.L.M. and S.J.D. from
Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago, Illinois.
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perhaps the greatest potential to succeed: the new South Africa.'" With
the electoral victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in the
April 1994 elections, 19 the nation will be subject to an interim constitu-
tion for the next five years. 20 By 1996, the new Parliament sitting in its
alternative role as constitutional assembly, must draft and approve a
permanent constitution.2' Although the book was primarily written prior
to the passage of the interim document, this study makes a major contri-
bution to the permanent constitutive process by gathering together the
various options for consideration. The purpose is not to create a blue-
print, but to outline the broad parameters of constitutional choice and
direction in which "constitutional engineers" should be thinking.
22
The author operates under three basic premises. First, he feels that
any new constitutional order must go beyond elite decisionmaking to
mass participation. 23 The new South African Minister of Justice,
Abdullah Omar, echoes Professor Motala's concerns with respect to the
constitution making process itself. "How can we ensure that our people
who have offered so many sacrifices in struggle, so many deaths, so
many hardships, imprisonment, detentions, fights and confrontations
with the system are not bypassed in the process of constitution-mak-
ing? 2
4
Second, Motala calls for the constitutional order to have the capabil-
ity to effect a socioeconomic transformation for the excluded South
African majority.25 The masses have suffered under several centuries of
discrimination and oppression, including the official apartheid legacy.26
18. ZIYAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1994).
19. The African National Congress (ANC) won 62.65% of the votes in South Africa's
first multi-racial democratic election. South African Vote Election Declared Fair; ANC Wins
Nearly 63%, ATLANTA J., May 6, 1994, at A8.
20. See S. AFR. CONST. (1993).
21. Id. at art. 73.
22. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 1.
23. Id.
24. Abdullah M. Omar, Combative's First Decade of Political Independence: Lessons for
South Africa and Namibia (Aug. 1990) (unpublished paper on file with author) (emphasis in
original).
25. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 1.
26. Id. at 1. Apartheid has been described as a "complex set of practices of domination
and subjugation, intensely hierarchized and sustained by the whole apparatus of the state
which affects the distribution of all values." MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 523 (1980). The roots of apartheid are found in the national
socialist policies of Nazi Germany and the fascist policies of Italy under Mussolini. See
generally BRIAN BUNTING, THE RISE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REICH 54-68 (1986) (discuss-
ing the influence of the Nazis on the members of the Nationalist Party and Afrikaner leader-
ship, many of whom sided with the Nazis against the Allies).
[Vol. 16:689
Towards Democracy in a New South Africa
Apartheid affected every area of life, including housing, land ownership,
education, health, employment, judicial administration, freedom of
speech and association, public accommodation, and marriage."
Third, the author wants a constitutional order that can bridge the
divisiveness engendered by apartheid to create a unitary South Africa.28
This divisiveness has included racial and ethnic tensions between the
major groups. Those designated white held protected positions at the top
of the hierarchy, with the somewhat larger British group dominating the
economic sphere and the Afrikaners dominating the political sphere
under the leadership of the National Party.29 The mixed race Coloureds °
and the Asians constituted buffer groups between whites and blacks and
held relative positions of privilege.
27. The Population Registration Act of 1950 classified everyone as either White,
Coloured, Indian, or Black. Population Registration Act, Act No. 30 of 1950, S. Afr. Stat.
275, 279 (1950).
No interracial sex or marriage was allowed under the Immorality Act. Immorality Act,
Act No. 23 of 1957, S. Aft. Stat. 276 (1957), and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, Act
No. 55 of 1949, S. Afr. Stat. 614 (1949).
The Group Areas Act mandated segregated living conditions. Group Areas Act, Act No.
36 of 1966, S. Afr. Stat. 141 (1966). Pass laws required that every black show his or her pass
authorizing him or her to be in a white area. Separate black homelands known as "bantu-
stans" were created for the different black ethnic groups, and four of these homelands opted
for so-called independence between 1976 and 1981. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF
SOUTH AFRICA 191-94 (1990); see also John Dugard, South Africa's "Independent" Home-
lands: An Exercise in Denationalization, 10 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11 (1980); Henry J.
Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African Bantustan Policy,
17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978). The so-called independent homelands were
Transkei, Venda, Bophutatswana, and Ciskei, and the remainder were Lebowa, Qwa-Qwa,
Kwazulu, KaNagwane, Gazanklu, and KwaNdebele. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 93-94 (1978). See also A. Leon Higginbotham et al., De Jure
Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial
Justice, 1990 ILL. L. REV. 763, 778-82 (1990); LAURINE PLATZKY & CHERRYL WALKER,
THE SURPLUS PEOPLE: FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 16 (1985).
The Separate Amenities Act segregated all facilities such as public toilets, parks, schools,
sports, public transport, etc. Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, Act No. 49 of 1953, S.
Aft. Stat. 311 (1953). The legacy of apartheid in education is revealed by the fact that 30% of
South Africa's 11 million workers have no education, and only 36% have been to primary
school. Only 7% of those blacks who made it to their secondary school final exams passed, as
compared to 97% of the whites. SEBASTIAN MALLABY, AFTER APARTHEID: THE FUTURE OF
SOUTH AFRICA 68-69 (1992).
28. Id. at 1.
29. A history of the South African conflict is beyond the scope of this review. For a
discussion of the white tribes, English, and Afrikaners, see MALLABY, supra note 27, at ch. 3.
The Afrikaners are descendants of Dutch immigrants who came to the Cape of Good Hope in
1652, fleeing religious persecution. For more on the Afrikaners, see, e.g., THOMPSON, supra
note 27; ROBERT LACOUR-GAYET, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (Stephen Hardman trans.,
1970).
30. The Coloureds are the descendants of Africans who intermixed with Afrikaners and
others.
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A unique feature of Motala's comparative approach is his decision
to include the experience of African countries rather than just Europe or
the United States. He evaluates constitutional models based upon their
potential for achieving the goals of democracy, socioeconomic transfor-
mation, and national unity.31 Additionally, Motala explores the three
broad schools of political thought with historical relevance to Africa:
liberalism, scientific socialism, and African socialism. Despite the
downfall of the Soviet Bloc and the resultant international discrediting
of doctrinaire socialism, he does not ignore the socialist influences on
the continent. He looks at how each school has influenced Africa and
South Africa, as well as how its constitutional theory views the public
exercise of power.
32
The book not only examines constitutional texts but places them
within the context of culture, and details the institutions and rules that
accompany them.33 Motala understands that constitutions are not neutral
documents, and that law can not be separated from politics.3 In addi-
tion, the relevance for South Africa is always elaborated.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONS
Professor Motala starts out his study by distinguishing constitutions
from constitutionalism. He notes that the latter concept includes not only
the written document, but the norms and institutional frameworks that
underly it. 35 The first chapter analyzes the philosophical notions of
constitutionalism from the perspective of the western liberal tradition.
This tradition emphasizes individual rights and the free enterprise sys-
tem.36 The three branches have separate powers, and there are regular
elections, as well as a multi-party political system. 37 Government is
31. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 2.
32. Id.
33. According to John Merryman, legal systems are composed of legal rules, institutions,
processes, culture, extension, and penetration. JOHN BARTON ET AL., LAW IN RADICALLY
DIFFERENT CULTURES 3 (1983).
34. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 3.
35. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 6: Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary
Discussion, 56 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 853 (1962). According to Nwabueze, the constitution is
both a symbol and instrument of constitutionalism. BENJAMIN 0. NWABUEZE, CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 23 (1973).
36. For a discussion of the liberal tradition, see MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARA-
TIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON THE CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW
AND SOCIALIST LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, WEST GERMAN,
ENGLISH AND SOVIET LAW (1984).
37. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 7.
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limited in both its powers and procedures, and rights are enforceable by
an independent judiciary.3"
The author continues by noting that the South African constitution
has been an outgrowth of the British Westminster system, since South
Africa is a former British colony.39 Unfortunately, the transplanted
system of parliamentary supremacy and weak separation. of powers
turned into a nightmare in South Africa. It became
a disease that grew and developed from what was effective govern-
ment in Britain, given to the hard won affirmation of individual
rights, into a monster that eventually devoured justice itself when
transplanted into colonial South Africa. In brief the monster has
two limbs: the unrestrained supremacy of Parliament and the con-
stitutional denial of democracy, both of which resulted in an all
powerful white racist rule.40
The rule of law, in the narrow sense of certain and clear rules, was
lacking in the apartheid state. The exercise of power was often arbitrary,
as evidenced by the various emergency laws 4' and States of Emergen-
cy.42 Motala classifies the apartheid legal system as being part of the
repressive machinery of the state in the orthodox Marxist sense.43 De-
spite the racism and repression in the legal system for the black popula-
38. Id.
39. Id. at 11. The South African legal system is a composite of African indigenous,
Roman, Dutch, and English influences. The Roman Dutch law is a hybrid of the Roman and
Germanic custom used in Holland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Higginbotham,
supra note 27, at 777 n.50.
40. Charles Villa Vicencio, Whither South Africa? Constitutionalism and Law Making,
40 EMORY L.J. 141, 145 (1991).
41. The vast array of security laws resulted in the arrest, detention, imprisonment,
torture, and banning of thousands of South Africans, without the protections of due process or
right to counsel. These laws are discussed in DUGARD, supra note 27; ANTHONY S.
MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: DILEMMAS OF THE APART-
HEID SOCIETY (1986); Lynn Berat, The South African Judiciary and the Protection of Human
Rights: A Strategy for a New South Africa, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 181 (1991). The laws
included the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, Act No. 44, S. Afr. Stat. 549 (1950),
later renamed the Internal Security Act of 1976, Act No. 79, 8 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA 921 (Butterworths, 1976); Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, Act No.
8, S. Afr. Stat. 35 (1953); Public Safety Act of 1953, Act No. 3, S. Afr. Stat. 12 (1953);
Sabotage Act of 1962, Act. No. 76, S. Aft. Stat. 1371 (1962); Terrorism Act of 1976, Act No.
83, S. Aft. Stat. 605 (1976); Internal Security Act of 1982, Act No. 74, 8 STATUTES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1291 (Butterworths, 1982).
42. Berat, supra note 41, at 192. States of Emergency were declared three times since
1960, with the most recent in June 1986. Proclamation 108 of 1986 in GOVERNMENT GA-
ZETTE, June 12, 1986, at 10279.
43. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 13. For a view that South Africa did conform to a repres-
sive model of law, see JOHN HUND & HENRIK W. VAN DER MERWE, LEGAL IDEOLOGY AND
POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH 11 (1986).
Spring 1995]
Michigan Journal of International Law
tion and their supporters, the same system operated as a liberal capitalist
democracy for the benefit of the white minority."4
II. DEMOCRACY: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION
The next chapter explores present conceptions of democracy in
western liberal, communist, and traditional African societies. Professor
Motala first sketches the traditional liberal view of direct participatory
democracy of all citizens as espoused by the Greeks and French philoso-
pher Jean Jacques Rousseau.45 He notes that this concept did not include
slaves or women in its concept of equality among citizens.46
The revisionist approach to liberal democracy rejects the traditional
one as too idealistic and unwieldy for a large population. It favors
instead a representational democracy, in which concerned citizens en-
trust elected officials with decision-making power.47 Equality of opportu-
nity to elect officials and not equality of actual power is the goal.48
Modem liberal theory describes the prevailing system and legitimates it,
rather than challenge its assumption that everyone has equal opportuni-
ties to participate. 49 The reality is that those with greater financial re-
sources can manipulate the political process. 50
Motala next discusses communism and Marxism. Karl Marx saw
communism as ideal democracy, whereas capitalism perpetuated class
inequalities. The only solution was the overthrow of capitalism and its
replacement with democratic socialism where all class distinctions were
eliminated. The status of workers would be thus enhanced and there
would be a dictatorship of the proletariat, which would be the agent for
effecting the transformation to democracy.5' Motala notes that the elite
rule that developed in the former Soviet Bloc was not what Marx had in
44. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 14.
45. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY
LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU (Ernest Barker trans., 1962).
46. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 31 n.12.
47. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS.
CONTROL 10-11 (1982); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 311 (1961).
48. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 22.
49. Id. at 23.
50. See Arthur Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commen-
tary on First National Bank v. Bellotti, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 38 (1981).
51. See KARL MARX ET AL., ON THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT: A COLLEC-
TION 5 (1984); KARL MARX & FREDERICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Samuel
Moore trans., 1948).
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mind.52 Lenin expanded Marx' conceptions by noting that the workers
did not possess the mentality to engage in democratic transformation on
their own. There had to be a vanguard movement to lead them.53 This
elitist element came to characterize the Soviet Bloc, and Motala finds it
clearly undemocratic.
Professor Motala next moves on to the conception of democracy
within traditional African societies. These cultures are based upon
communitarianism, rather than the western notion of liberalism.
Communitarianism is concerned with an emphasis on various kinds of
groups, such as the family, ethnic groups, and community organizations,
and the duties and obligations that one has to such groups. 4 African
custom and religion, which form the backdrop of communitarianism,
have mandated obedience to a traditional ruler. This chief was always a
male from the appropriate lineage. He may have solicited advice from
elder males who represented certain clans or groups, and often consen-
sus decisions were reached after prolonged consultation between the
elders and the chief.5 5 As was the case with Athenian democracy and
early American democracy, women were excluded from the formal
process.56 The socioeconomic system was communal, with property
being held by the clan or tribe. Private property ownership did not exist
and the tribe looked out for the welfare of all its members."
III. STATE ORGANIZATION AND FEDERALISM IN AFRICA
The book next goes on to highlight the primary differences between
the unitary and federal forms of a state, especially as seen in the African
context. Some African nations such as Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and
Ghana, became federal states at independence as a means to implement
52. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 27.
53. See VLADIMIR LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (Joe Fineburg & George Hanna trans.,
1988).
54. See generally Wing, supra note 1. For more on communitarian theory, see MICHAEL
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE
(1983); Clarke E. Cochran, The Thin Theory of Community: The Communitarians and their
Critics, 32 POL. STUD. 422 (1989); Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberal-
ism, 18 POL. THEORY 6 (1990).
55. For a discussion of traditional decisionmaking, see JARAMOGI 0. ODINGA, NOT YET
UHURU: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OGINGA ODINGA 12 (1967); KOF A. BUSIA, AFRICA IN
SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY 23 (1967); KOFI A. BUSIA, THE POSITION OF THE CHIEF IN THE
MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE ASHANTI 14-16 (1968).
56. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 35 n.118.
57. Ziyad Motala, Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological and Legal Examina-
tion, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 382 (1989).
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powersharing among the various ethnic, religious, and linguistic
groups."8
It is here that Motala first discusses the notion of consociational
democracy, which he sees as a form of federalism. It has been used
successfully in societies such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and
Austria to protect the political and cultural status of distinct ethnic,
racial, or religious groups. Consociation is based upon the notions of
executive power sharing among the groups, segmental autonomy of each
group, group proportionality in all institutions of government, and
minority group veto power.59 In the 1970s and 1980s, some South
African political theorists and governmental officials considered adopt-
ing consociational democracy as a possible compromise between the
apartheid status quo and Westminster democracy. 6°
IV. WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS
AND GOVERNMENT IN AFRICA
In Chapter Five, Professor Motala focuses on the distinctions be-
tween the powers of different branches of government in the Westmin-
ster parliamentary system of Great Britain, the French Presidential
system, and the federal presidential model of the United States. 6' Anoth-
er alternative is presented in the German federal parliamentary system
with its notion of the welfare state, which guarantees economic, social,
58. For a discussion of sources on federalism in Africa, see Kon A. BUSIA, AFRICA IN
SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 55; OBAFEMI AWOLOWO, THOUGHTS ON THE NIGERIAN
CONSTITUTION (1966); R.B. NEUBERGER, CONCEPTS OF NATIONHOOD IN THE THOUGHT OF
SELECTED AFRICAN LEADERS 204 (1975); BENJAMIN 0. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NIGERIA (1982); T.O. ELIAS, NIGERIA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND
CONSTITUTION 121 (1967); BENJAMIN 0. NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH
AFRICA 139 (1974); S.A. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTIONS
263 (1964).
59. For the writings of its major proponent, Arend Lijphart, see, e.g., AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 25 (1977).
60. See S. Venter, Some of South Africa's Political Alternatives in Consociational
Perspective, S. AFR. INT'L 129, 131 (1981); Arend Lijphart, Federal, Confederal, and
Consociational Options for the South African Plural Society, in CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE
IN SOUTH AFRICA (Robert I. Rotberg & John Barratt eds., 1980); N.J. Rhoodie, Value
Consensus as a Prerequisite for Consociationalism in Southern Africa, in POLITICAL ALTER-
NATIVES FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA 486 (D.J. Van Vuuren & D.J. Kriek eds., 1983); AREND
LIJPHART, POWER-SHARING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1985); LAURENCE J. BOULLE, CONSTITU-
TIONAL REFORM AND THE APARTHEID STATE: LEGITIMACY, CONSOCIATIONALISM AND
CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA (1984). For a critique of consociation, see John McGarry &
S.J.R. Noel, The Prospects for Consociational Democracy in South Africa, 17 J. COMMON-
WEALTH COMP. POL. 3 (1989).
61. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 46.
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and cultural rights through government intervention.62 Consociation as a
type of federalism in western European nations is discussed in more
detail than in the previous chapter.6
3
The British and French models have been particularly popular in
Africa due to the large number of former colonies of these two na-
tions.' One difference from Great Britain in the former British colonies
was that the parliamentary system was introduced within a federal rather
than unitary state. This was the case in Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, and
Kenya. Additionally, these countries incorporated a bill of rights, which
is not the case in Great Britain. 65 Professor Motala notes that liberal
approaches to constitutional change in South Africa have shifted from
the simple federal system of the United States to a model advocating the
protection of group identity and group rights within a consociation
framework. 66
V. SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT
The book next provides a detailed overview of the various constitu-
tions and governments of South Africa. The South Africa Constitution
Act of 190967 introduced a variant of the British Westminster system
within a unitary state of four provinces. Blacks and Coloureds were on
a common voting roll with whites, and could vote, at least theoretically,
in two provinces. In practice, however, few could actually vote due to
income and property requirements. In 1936 Blacks were removed from
the common voting roll, and Coloureds were removed in 1956.68
Although racism was a part of white domination before 1948,
apartheid as a legal system of official racial segregation was instituted
when the Nationalist Party came into power that year.69 The new gov-
erning party decided to create separate "nations" for the various disen-
62. Id. at 54.
63. Id. at 57.
64. Former British colonies in Africa include: Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Francophonic Africa includes: Benin, Togo, Mali,
Gabon, Senegal, Guinea, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, Morocco, and Algeria.
65. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 61.
66. Id. at 62.
67. South Africa Act, Sept. 20, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, ch. 9, pt. 11 (1909), reprinted in HENRY
MAY, SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION, (lst ed. 1950), at appendix 48.
68. See Representation of Natives Act, Act No. 12, 10 UNIoN STATUTES (1910-1947)
443, 449-53 (1936); Separate Representation of Voters Act, Act No. 30, S. Aft. Stat. 443
(1956).
69. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 27. The Nationalist Party was influenced by the
Nazis and the fascist policies of Mussolini's Italy. See BRIAN BUNTING, THE RISE OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN REICH (1986).
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franchised black ethnic groups. In theory, blacks would lose their South
African citizenship and gain citizenship in their ethnic homeland, when
it became an independent nation, even if they had never visited those
desolate places.70 Four of these homelands, Transkei, Venda, Ciskei, and
Bophutatswana, were eventually granted independence, which no coun-
try recognized except South Africa. Millions of black South Africans
were thus forcibly stripped of their citizenship.
In 1983, the last apartheid constitution was passed, and it radically
altered the Westminster tradition even further by combining a parlia-
mentary system with a presidential model.7' While the blacks were still
excluded, Coloureds and Indians were now entitled to vote for racially
separate houses in a tricameral parliament.72 The president was elected
for a five year term by an electoral college made up of members of the
three houses, in a ratio of four whites: two Coloureds: and one Indian.73
All matters relating to blacks were left within the state president's
authority. 74
VI. FEDERALISM AND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONS
IN AFRICAN STATES
Chapter Seven focuses on the successes and failures of African
states with the federal and liberal constitutional model. Professor Motala
concludes that such constitutional transfers have been a failure in Africa
because of their inability to deal with issues such as national unity and
socioeconomic change.75 The federal model has fostered African ethnic
conflicts, rather than minimized them, and the author is skeptical that
such models are appropriate for culturally diverse countries.76 United
States federalism is not based at all on cultural, religious, or ethnic
differences. In Africa, citizens retain allegiance to their ethnic group
which is politically empowered within the federal system, rather than
gaining a new sense of national consciousness.77 Political upheavals
70. The Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970, Act No. 26, S. Afr. Stat. 1771, 1776(1970).
71. See Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, Act No. 110, entered into force Sept.
3, 1984, S. Afr. Stat. 1301 (1983).
72. Id. art 52, S. Aft. Stat. at 1333.
73. Id. art. 7 (1)(b), S. Aft. Stat. at 1305.
74. Id. art. 93, S. Afr. Stat. at 1355.
75. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 84.
76. Id. at 85.
77. S.A. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTION 117 (1964).
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have been experienced in such federal states as Congo (Zaire), Uganda,
and Nigeria.78
In an era of limited economic resources, it has been too expensive
to maintain regional and national organs of government within the
federal model in Africa. Vast disparities in economic development have
occurred in federal states, with the more powerful ethnic groups being
able to redirect resources in a disproportionate manner.
79
One problem with Professor Motala's argument is that he seems to
blame ethnic breakdown on the federal form of the state. Many African
nations have experienced ethnic tensions and violence even within a
unitary framework. The Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda do not live in a
federal state, but have managed to take ethnic cleansing to a new level
on the African continent.8' The Arab northern Sudanese and the African
Christian or animist southern Sudanese have managed to keep a civil
war going for many years in a unitary state.8' It would be very difficult
to factor out what fraction of the violence in some countries may be due
to the federal nature of the state. At the end of the twentieth century, we
are seeing a resurgence of ethnic violence in formerly peaceful Yugosla-
via, based on tensions that go back hundreds of years. The former
Soviet Union is threatening to break up into smaller and smaller ethnic
enclaves. Africa may just be the most uninterrupted example of ethnic
tensions spanning a wide variety of governmental frameworks.
Professor Motala definitively rejects the federal or consociational
model in the South African context.82 According to Motala, this notion
of pluralism is inappropriate in the South African context because it is
ahistorical and fails adequately to describe the influence of apartheid on
ethnic divisions. 83 The only ones to benefit from a South African federal
model would be those whites and homeland leaders who already hold a
disproportionate share of political and economic power. Decentralizing
authority on such matters as education, culture, and business to the local
level would leave the national government with limited power and
78. For more on these conflicts, see MICHAEL A. TABUWE, THE ONE PARTY SYSTEM
AND AFRICAN TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 19 (1980); RONALD L. WATTS, NEW FEDERA-
TIONS: EXPERIMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH (1966); NWABUEZE, supra note 58.
79. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 86-87.
80. For an example of the numerous articles on Rwanda, see Sonja Pace, Scenes from A
Nightmare, AFR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 41.
81. See Angela M. Lloyd, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1994).
82. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 2.
83. Id. at 2-3.
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resources to effect socioeconomic change for the majority of South
Africans.84
Instead of the federal model, Professor Motala espouses a unitary
system that institutionalizes civil and political equality and downplays
ethnic privileges. Improving educational and occupational opportunities
would lessen conflict between groups and enable the government to
produce socioeconomic transformation. The constitution must actually
foster national unity and assist in the restructuring of civil society.85
While I agree with Professor Motala's goals, I do not see how they
will be attained in the current world economy. Africa is falling further
and further behind, and is wracked by disease, 6 drought, and a lack of
markets for the limited crops or products that it does produce. In condi-
tions of deep poverty, there would be an inevitable scramble for scarce
resources, even if all citizens were of the same ethnicity. Can democracy
exist, much less flourish, in such an environment? This sort of question
would have been very interesting to analyze within the African context.
Some African political elites and scholars have justified the lack of
democracy by citing the need to protect weak states from ethnic ten-
sion. 7 Others have claimed that urgent economic development does not
permit democratic debate.8 8 According to some political theorists, de-
mocracy can not take root in Africa because it lacks the necessary
preconditions: widespread literacy, a high per capita income, a sizeable
middle class, a vibrant civil society, strong independent public institu-
tions, national rather than ethnic political parties, and a political culture
of tolerance, debate, and compromise.89 Other theorists have reversed the
analysis. They claim that the lack of democracy is the cause of contin-
ued poverty on the continent.90 An analysis of these possibilities would
have enhanced Motala's study, and made it even more useful for re-
source strapped African nations.
84. Id. at 88.
85. Id. at 100.
86. As an example of the diseases affecting the continent, there are more than two
million adults with AIDS, two-thirds of the present world total. Wilson Wanene, AIDS:
Pioneering Africa's Research, Api. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 45, 46.
87. Wing, supra note 1, at 308.
88. Carol Lancaster, Democracy in Africa, 85 FOREIGN POL'Y 148, 149 (1991-92).
89. Id. at 157.
90. These sentiments were expressed by delegates at the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa, held in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1990. The African Charter for Participa-
tion in Popular Development was adopted. Anaclet Rwagayura, Africa: Putting People First
in Development, Inter Press Service, Feb. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Inpress File.
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VII. THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
AND AFRICAN MARXIST STATES
After expressing his skepticism about the federal model for South
Africa, Professor Motala discusses various socialist models. In contrast
to the liberal view, some Marxist theorists see law as an instrument of
class rule.9' Marxist theory interprets the trappings of the liberal state,
such as parliamentary democracy, as frauds disguising the reality of
oppression and exploitation. 92 On the other hand, there are socialist
theorists who support several liberal assumptions, such as the need for
the rule of law. For them the rule of law is necessary because it effec-
tively inhibits the use of power.93 According to classical Marxism, the
law becomes unnecessary as the state eventually withers away. 94
Modem Marxist theorists have had to explain the fact that the state
in the former Soviet Union did not wither away. In contrast to liberal
theory, which strives for the separation of the state and the individual,
Marxist theorists maintain that the state in the communist order was not
coercive and was merged with society. 9 Since the state and society were
one, there was no need to espouse separation of powers in the Soviet
constitutional system. Following the Leninist concept of a vanguard
party, the Communist Party played a dominant role.9' Although federal-
ism existed in the former Soviet Union, with the fifteen republics based
on ethnic clusters, there was no strict demarcation of power between the
national and local levels. 97
Motala next discusses three countries in Africa that pursued the
Soviet model of constitutionalism. These were Angola, Guinea-Bissau,
and Mozambique, which all fought prolonged guerrilla wars against the
Portuguese.98 The contradiction within these countries, according to
91. HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW, ch. 2 (1982).
92. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 110.
93. See e.g., EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLOCK
ACT 266 (1975).
94. VLADIMIR LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION, ch. 5 (1932).
95. WILLIAM G. ANDREWS & FRANZ D. SCHOLZ, SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES:
INSIDE VIEWS 53 (1966).
96. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 114.
97. Id. at 115.
98. For further discussion, see Luis B. SERAPAIO & MOHAMED A. EL-KHAWAS, MOZAM-
BIQUE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE (1979); KEITH
SOMERVILLE, ANGOLA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY (1986); BASIL DAVIDSON, GROW-
ING FROM THE GRASSROOTS: THE STATE OF GUINEA-BISSAU (1974); LARS RUDEBECK,
GUINEA-BISSAU: A STUDY OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION (1974); JOSEPH HANLON, MOZAM-
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Motala, was that they espoused mass political participation while main-
taining the notion of the vanguard party. The democratic centralism of
these countries meant that decisions came from a very few elites at the
top.99
While Mozambique and Angola have been wracked by war for
many years, Guinea-Bissau has had enough peace to be able to judge
the effectiveness of the Soviet constitutional model. In that country, the
lack of participation was combined with coercion, manipulation, and
corruption, which eroded governmental legitimacy and led to two
coups. 1° Although Motala's overall assessment of the Soviet experiment
in Africa is bleak, he does offer the positive lesson of experiments with
production and village councils. To the extent that the experience of
Mozambique can be evaluated, its use of the Soviet constitutional model
demonstrates that ethnic tensions can best be checked in a unitary state.
It also highlights the need to contain middle class bureaucracies to
prevent them from dominating governmental processes.101
VIII. AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ONE-PARTY STATES
Professor Motala next delves into African socialism, which is an
indigenous, vaguely defined concept with some similarities to doctrinaire
Marxism. Various African leaders have developed their own notions of
African socialism, including Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Julius Nyerere
of Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Muammar al-Qadaffi of
Libya. Some of these leaders, including Senghor and Nyerere, have
located the roots of this concept in precolonial society.' 2 In so doing,
they have drawn on the portrayal of traditional precolonial society as
democratic and harmonious.0 3 Nyerere enunciated the concept of
Ujamaa (familyhood) socialism:
BIQUE: THE REVOLUTION UNDER FIRE (1984); AFRO-MARXIST REGIMES: IDEOLOGY AND
PUBLIC POLICY (Edmond Keller & Donald Rothchild eds., 1987); ROSEMARY E. GALLI &
JOCELYN JONES, GUINEA-BISSAU: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY (1987). Motala does
not mention the similar experience of the other former Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde
and Sao Tome & Principe.
99. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 132.
100. GALLI & JONES, supra note 98, at 71.
101. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 135.
102. ONESIMO SILVEIRA, AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA: PARTY SYSTEMS AND IDEOLO-
GIES OF SOCIALISM 112 (1976).
103. See, e.g., JULIUS E. NYERERE, NYERERE ON SOCIALISM (1969); Jomo KENYATTA,
FACING MOUNT KENYA (1958); JOSEPH KIZERBO, HISTORIE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1972).
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The foundation, and the objective, of African socialism is the ex-
tended family.... Ujamaa ... or "Familyhood" describes our
socialism. It is opposed to capitalism which seeks to build a happy
society on the exploitation of man by man, and it is equally op-
posed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy soci-
ety on a philosophy of conflict between man and man.
We, in Africa, have no more need of being "converted to
socialism" than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are
rooted in our own past - in the traditional society which produced
US.
104
Various 'leaders have espoused the one party state as the proper
representation of the unified society. They felt that democracy could
exist within the one party framework as long as the masses could partic-
ipate in the political process.'0 5 Some leaders such as Nyerere empha-
sized the need to nationalize the economy to benefit the entire society."
Others such as Kenyatta and Senghor thought that their entire societies
would be better served by private enterprise.'0 7
Several writers have debunked the view of traditional African soci-
ety as democratic. While some societies may have had rudimentary
elements of democracy, there were autocratic and despotic trends in
others. Hierarchy, gerontocracy, and the total exclusion of women were
often the rule.10 8 According to Professor Motala and others, the one
party state, typified by limited citizen participation, corruption, and
swollen bureaucracies, has failed miserably." 9 Socioeconomic transfor-
mations benefitting the masses of people did not take place, and in some
cases income gaps actually widened."0 Tanzanian law professor Issa
Shivji sees these African socialist states as having little to do with
socialism. They are instead ideological fig leaves to cover authoritarian-
ism."I' The chapter concludes by noting that South Africa needs to avoid
104. Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism, in UJAMAA: ESSAYS
ON SOCIALISM 1, 11-12 (1968).
105. See W.J. Breytenbach, One Party Regimes and Majority Rule, 15 BULL. AFR. INST.
18 (1977).
106. JULIUS K. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND UNITY 167 (1967).
107. SILvEIRA, supra note 102, at 142.
108. V.G. Simiyu, The Democratic Myth in the African Traditional Societies, in WALTER
OYUGI ET AL., DEMOCRATIC THEORY & PRACTICE IN AFRICA 49 (1988).
109. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 153.
110. Joel D. Barkan, On Comparing East African Political Systems, in POLITICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN KENYA AND TANZANIA 3, 20 (Joel D. Barkan & John J. Okumu eds.,
1979).
111. ISSA G. SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 58 (1989).
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these pitfalls and develop institutions that spread power beyond elites in
a one party framework."2
IX. SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
This chapter analyzes the constitutional options that have been
proposed by political organizations in South Africa. Professor Motala
starts with CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa), the
assembly of nineteen groups that started negotiations in December 1991.
Unfortunately, the author does not detail the negotiating process itself. It
may be that the book was in the later stages of editing at that point, and
it would have been too much new material.113 He does have an Epilogue
concerning the ultimate result of the CODESA process, the Interim
Constitution."
4
Motala does detail the positions of several of the groups in
CODESA.1 5 He analyzes the white liberal groups, such as the Demo-
cratic Party (DP), 16 the Progressive Federal Party (PFP)," 7 and the New
Republic Party (NRP)," which favored the federal consociation mod-
el." 9 He also discusses the similar position of the ruling National Party.
The National Party favored consociation with devolution of power to the
local level, with protection for individual and private property rights as
well as minority (white) rights.120 The Inkatha Freedom Party, led by
Kwazulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, also favored the consociation
approach, which would allow the Kwazulu region to retain power,
12
'
Motala briefly covers the positions of the South African Communist
Party, 2 a long time ally of the ANC, and the all black Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC). 23 The PAC split off from the ANC in 1959, and
112. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 159.
113. For a discussion of the CODESA process, see Wing, supra note 1, at 364.
114. Motala, supra note 18, at 245-50.
115. The only groups not participating were right-wing whites of the AWB (Afrikaaner
Weerstands Beweeging), the HNP (Herstigte National Party) and the CP (Conservative Party),
as well as two left-wing black groups, the PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) and AZAPO
(Azanian People's Organization). CP and PAC Invited to Participate in Codesa II, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEws SERVICE, Apr. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Xinhua File.
116. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 165.
117. Id. at 166.
118. Id. at 168.
119. Id. at 169.
120. Id. at 170.
121. Id. at 171.
122. 2 ROBERT H. DAVIES ET AL., THE STRUGGLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 292 (1984).
123. PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS, ONE AZANIA, ONE NATION, ONE PEOPLE! SPEECHES
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS (1977).
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espoused the African nationalist ideology that only Africans could
participate in the liberation struggle, instead of the multiracial ANC
approach."l Additionally, Motala details positions of the Black Con-
sciousness Movements best typified by the late Steve Biko,25 and
currently represented by the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO).
Motala spends the most time discussing the historical constitutional
positions of the ANC. The 1955 Freedom Charter was the framework
for the multiracial organization until 1990.126 It took the form of a broad
manifesto rather than a constitutional blueprint. Because most of Africa
was still under colonial rule at the time of its creation, the Charter was
a revolutionary document. It demanded that:
the people shall govern: all national groups shall have equal rights;
the people shall share in the country's wealth; the land shall be
shared among those who work it; all shall be equal before the law;
we shall enjoy equal human rights; there shall be work and securi-
ty; the doors of learning and culture shall be opened; there shall be
houses, security, and comfort; and there shall be peace and friend-
ship.127
The ANC next developed a series of documents in the 1980s that
specifically elaborated its vision of a multiracial, democratic South
Africa, guaranteeing civil and political rights as well as some economic,
social, and cultural rights. Motala only mentions the 1988 Constitutional
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa.12' This document called for a
124. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 189.
125. STEPHEN BIKO, I WRITE WHAT I LIKE (1986). Mr. Biko was killed in police deten-
tion in September 1977.
126. The Freedom Charter, June 26, 1955, reprinted in THE FREEDOM CHARTER AND
THE FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FREEDOM CHARTER AND
THE FUTURE (James A. Polley ed., 1988). For further discussion, see generally ALBERT
LUTHULI, LET MY PEOPLE Go: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1983); THOMAS KA~iS & GWENDOLYN
M. CARTER, 3 FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AFRICAN
POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1882-1964 (1973); THIRTY YEARS OF THE FREEDOM CHARTER
(Ray Suttner & J. Cronin eds., 1986); GILBERT MARCUS, THE FREEDOM CHARTER: A BLUE-
PRINT FOR DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA (1985); THE FREEDOM CHARTER AND THE FUTURE,
supra; SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE FREEDOM CHARTER, 1955-1985 (1985).
127. The Freedom Charter, supra note 126, at 249.
128. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC
SOUTH AFRICA (1988), reprinted in 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 App. A [hereinafter
GUIDELINES]. For a discussion of the philosophy behind these guidelines, see Albie Sachs,
Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Constitutional Framework, 6 WORLD POL'Y J. 589 (1989).
For a general discussion, see Hugh Corder & Dennis Davis, The Constitutional Guidelines of
the African National Congress: A Preliminary Assessment, 106 S. AFR. L.J. 633 (1989);
Johan D. van der Vyver, Comments on the Constitutional Guidelines of the African National
Congress, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 133 (1989).
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Bill of Rights, equality between the sexes, and affirmative action, 129 and
fit squarely within the liberal paradigm.
The book would have profited from also analyzing the 1990 Propos-
al for a Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa."3" This document
protected the right to own private property, but also recognized the
state's interest in exploiting natural resources.' Since the apartheid
regime restricted property ownership to the nonblack population, refor-
mulations of property rights would help address one of Motala's con-
cerns - socieconomic transformation. In 1992, the ANC published a
revised text of the ANC draft Bill of Rights, based upon comments
received on its 1990 version. 32 The revised Bill tackled the highly
controversial issue of homosexual rights by forbidding discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.
In addition to proposals concerning a Bill of Rights, the ANC devel-
oped several other constitutional documents. The 1990 What is a Consti-
tution?133 built upon the 1988 Guidelines, and the 1991 Constitutional
Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa called for a
constitutional court with the power of judicial review. '3 All of these
documents provide rich ground for exploration of the issues about which
Motala is concerned, such as political empowerment of the masses,
political unification of ethnic groups, and socioeconomic transformation.
129. GUIDELINES, supra note 128.
130. ANC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH
AFRICA (1990), reprinted in 18 Soc. JUST. 49 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Draft Bill]; see
Nicholas Haysom, Democracy, Constitutionalism, and the ANC's Bill of Rights for a New
South Africa, 18 Soc. JUST. 40 (1991).
131. 1990 Draft Bill, supra note 130, art. 11.
132. African National Congress Constitutional Committee, A Bill of Rights for a New
South Africa (1992), reprinted in ALBIE SACHS, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH
AFRICA (1992) App. 1.
133. ANC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION? (1990).
134. ANC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, ANC CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND
STRUCTURES FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 24 (1991). Countries like Mali, Gabon,
Togo, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Senegal, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Comoros have constitu-
tional courts. Franck Moderne, Human Rights and Postcolonial Constitutions in Subsahara
Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS 315, 337. For discussion of these options, see
Ziyad Motala, Independence of the Judiciary, Prospects and Limitations of Judicial Review in
Terms of the United States Model in a South African Order: Towards an Alternative Judicial
Structure, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 367, 397 (1991); Pennell Maduna, Judicial Review and the
Protection of Human Rights under a New Constitutional Order in South Africa, 21 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73 (1989).
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X. THE CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
This chapter tackles the difficult question of the role of the judiciary
in Anglo-American systems and the possibilities for a new South Africa.
Since South Africa had an almost all white male judiciary appointed by
the apartheid regime, the issue confronting a new government is how to
democratize the judges and the entire structure. After first discussing the
scope of judicial review in the United States, Professor Motala analyzes
the British variant, parliamentary supremacy, in which judges do not
have the right to declare an act of Parliament unconstitutional.'35
While traditional African societies had no concept of judicial re-
view, the newly independent countries followed the examples of their
former colonizers. 136 South Africa followed the British model. Motala
calls for the creation of a special constitutional court, separate from the
regular courts. This approach follows the model of several European
countries such as Germany. 137 The judges, according to this model,
should be periodically elected rather than appointed to the bench. 38 The
South African interim constitution created just such a constitutional
court with eleven members elected for nonrenewable seven year
terms. 139 An independent Judicial Services Commision is responsible for
proposing names for some of the vacancies, removing them from the
politicized appointment process. 140
X. CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
FOR SOUTH AFRICA
The last chapter summarizes Professor Motala's constitutional
proposals for a new South Africa. He proposes a unitary, nonfederal
state with guarantees for civil and political rights. One limitation would
restrict the freedom of speech and assembly of those who promote
ethnic chauvinism, racism, or tribalism. 141 While these limitations con-
tradict United States interpretations of free speech, the German Basic
135. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND CASES ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
FRENCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN LAW 468 (2d ed. 1994).
136. The French system utilizes a constitutional council to preview legislation before it
is promulgated. Id. at 77.
137. Id. at 92.
138. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 222.
139. S. AFR. CONST. art. 99.
140. Id. art 99.
141. MOTALA, supra note 18, at 234.
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Law permits limiting certain rights. Based upon the legacy of World
War Two, the German Constitutional Court outlawed political groups
that promote Nazism or fascism. 42 Due to the South African legacy of
apartheid, Motala calls upon the new South African constitutional struc-
tures to do the same. South African political parties should be required
to have democratic structures, as is the case in Germany as well.
Additionally, Motala advocates certain economic, social, and cultural
rights such as free education, health care, and adequate housing. Enter-
prises under state control should have worker control or participation in
order to avoid the experience of elite or bureaucratic domination seen in
other African and socialist nations. He also wants to avoid future strong-
men, and calls for the promotion of accountibility by officials "in ways
that move beyond the limited elite model of periodic election and rota-
tion of officials." '43 Professor Motala admits that this approach has not
been tried in any country, and he does not offer detailed guidance as to
what such a model would entail. Does he envision village councils or
some kind of true socialism as envisioned by Marx? Perhaps he means
the kind of African socialism that has never occurred, with true equality
and consultation.
The legislature should be the only law-making body, and the terms
of its members should be limited.'" The bicameral legislature should
have a lower house based upon single member constituencies, and the
upper house would be comprised of representatives from political parties
elected on a proportional basis. 45 The executive should follow the
parliamentary model and be accountable to the legislature, rather than
directly to the people. While the executive must be accountable, Motala
does not explain why the Presidential model with the executive directly
answerable to the people would not be better.
After detailing the various major socioeconomic models in the
world, Motala ultimately calls for a flexible approach incorporating
relevant parts of the liberal, socialist, and African socialist approaches.
Unbridled capitalism, he concludes, would perpetuate the status quo of
privilege for the wealthy, while state socialism has often led to stagna-
tion and bureaucracy.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 236.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 237.
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CONCLUSION
Since Professor Motala's study was written before the passage of the
interim constitution, he could only deal with that document in a brief
epilogue. Now that we are in a five year interim period, it would be
valuable to assess what constitutional options may be advisable given
the constraints imposed by the current document. Many political com-
promises were made to create this document between the major parties,
the then ruling National Party, the ANC and Inkatha. Now that there has
been an election, with a Parliament dominated by the ANC and a gov-
ernment led by Mandela, the political climate has shifted. It may be
possible to implement options espoused by the ANC in its various
documents. The PAC and other groups have marginal importance, and
even Inkatha did worse than anticipated in the elections. While it is still
early in the interim period, the ANC may have a clear mandate to
dominate the Constitutional Assembly and impose its views. On the
other hand, in the interests of national unity, the ANC may choose the
status quo and only tinker with the interim document. A resurgence of
the Inkatha violence that has ceased since the 1994 elections would be
devastating. The ANC is further constrained by the constitutional princi-
ples that are incorporated in Schedule 4 of the constitution. Article 71
states that the new constitution must comply with these principles,
which basically follow the liberal paradigm, guaranteeing civil and
political rights. 146 Now that various new structures are in place, it may
be difficult to think of switching to a third alternative in six years. The
consociation model that Motala repeatedly denounces may thus be dead
at last. Those groups favoring such an approach, including Inkatha and
the National Party, do not command a large enough part of the represen-
tatives in the Constitutional Assembly to be persuasive. The new consti-
tutional court is barely getting started, and it is unlikely that there would
be sufficient momentum to kill it, especially if the alternative is the
unelected white judiciary that the new government was forced to retain.
Mandela is the father of the nation, and if he continues to use his new
powers in a cautious way as he has been doing thus far there will be no
outcry, especially from his majority party, to further constrain the Presi-
dent's powers. On the other hand, if Mandela dies, and his successor
attempts to follow a strongman approach, there may be calls to make the
president a ceremonial head of state position, and to create a prime
minister who administers the government under strict constraints.
146. S. AFR. CONST. Sch. 4.
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The socioeconomic transformations that Motala seeks are also
unlikely to be manifested in a mere five years. As an example, black
South African women have been doubly discriminated against historical-
ly, on the basis of both their race and their gender. 147 Under apartheid,
they were legally restricted as all blacks were to the most menial posi-
tions, and saddled with the majority of child care responsibilities for
both black and white children. Additionally, they suffered and continue
to suffer under African customary laws that limit their ability to marry,
own property, inherit, gain child custody, and otherwise exercise the
rights of citizens. 148 It may take generations to transform the position of
these women, much in the same way it is taking generations to raise the
status of African American women, who likewise continue to suffer
from a dual legacy of race/gender discrimination.
149
In conclusion, Professor Motala has produced a useful study, which
conveniently collects all the various options in a succinct and readable
form. It is sure to be utilized by South African constitutional
decisionmakers and scholars, and has much to offer all those concerned
with democracy on the African continent.
147. Adrien K. Wing & Eunice de Carvalho, Black South African Women: Towards
Equal Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS J. (1995).
148. HILDA BERNSTEIN, FOR THEIR TRIUMPHS AND FOR THEIR TEARS: WOMEN IN
APARTHEID 7 (1985).
149. For a collection of writings on the legal status of Black American women, see
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Wing ed., forthcoming 1996).
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